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Abstract Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a
promising wireless sensor technology in the Internet of
Things and can be applied for object identification. However,
the security issues are still open challenges and should be
addressed to achieve enhanced safeguard. Existing security
solutions mainly apply logical operators, hash function, and
other cryptographic primitives to design authentication
schemes. In this paper, we propose a Chebyshev chaotic
map-based authentication protocol (C2MP) for the RFID
applications. Thereinto, Chebyshev polynomial’s semigroup
and chaotic properties are introduced for identity authenti-
cation and anonymous data transmission. The proposed
C2MP owns the security properties including data integrity,
authentication, anonymity, and session freshness. According
to the BAN logic, security formal analysis is performed
based on the messages formalization, initial assumptions,
anticipant goals, and logic verification. It indicates that the
proposed C2MP is suitable for universal RFID applications.
Keywords Radio frequency identification (RFID) 
Authentication  Chebyshev chaotic map  Protocol 
Security
1 Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a promising
wireless sensor technology in the Internet of Things (IoT)
and can be applied for object identification in various
applications such as supply chain, logistics, and asset
management. Due to the open wireless communication
channels, the reader–tag air interface is suffering from
several security threats and attacks [1, 2]. Consequently,
security issues become key concerns with the increasing
popularity of RFID systems. It is necessary to propose an
authentication scheme for security protection in the RFID
applications.
In RFID systems, readers are deployed for distributed
tag data acquirement, collection and extraction in wireless
radio environments. The open environments during the
system operations bring serious security challenges. Due to
the tags are assigned with sensitive data involving a wide
variety of applications from transportation, logistics, to
asset management [3, 4]. Therefore, RFID systems differ
from the traditional wireless systems, which suffer from
more insecure situations and may be subject to more
attacks for commercial purposes.
Several security solutions have been proposed to
address potential security problems in RFID systems,
including physical mechanisms, authentication protocols,
access control protocols, and encryption algorithms.
Thereinto, authentication protocols are the principal
schemes that own ubiquitous applicability. There are
three main categories of authentication protocols
according to the weight of cryptographic primitives [13].
Concretely, the ultra-lightweight protocols mainly apply
the bitwise logical operators and pseudo-random number
generator (PRNG) to achieve safeguard [5–7]. The
lightweight protocols mainly use cyclic redundancy code
(CRC) operator, message authentication code (MAC),
and hash function to realize identity authentication [8–
11]. The middleweight protocols introduce the full-
fledged symmetric/asymmetric encryption [e.g., elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC)] for the applications with
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higher security requirements (e.g., finance, and military)
[12–15]. However, several complicated protocols may be
limited by the tag hardware requirements such as power
consumption, storage space, and computational capacity.
Hence, it is necessary to propose a suitable authentication
scheme to achieve improved robustness, reliability and
security. The existing security schemes are mainly based
on the modern cryptography for different RFID applica-
tions. Recently, chaos encryption becomes an attractive
direction to address security issues. Thereinto, Chebyshev
chaotic map owns perfect randomness, semi-group and
chaotic properties for the chaotic sequences, which can
be introduced for identity authentication and anonymous
transmission.
A sound security solution should achieve three main
security requirements in RFID applications [16]. (1)
Authentication: The readers and tags should pass the
verification by the backend database so that any illegal
reader cannot access the system for resource abuse, and
any illegal tag cannot pass the verification for information
cheat. (2) Anonymity: Both readers and tags should protect
their own identifiers during ongoing communications, and
attackers cannot obtain any sensitive information with
privacy considerations. (3) Session freshness: The inter-
active session can be regarded as freshness due to the
random operators, any attackers cannot correlate two
communication sessions, and also cannot derive the pre-
vious or subsequent interrogations according to the current
session.
In this work, we propose a Chebyshev chaotic map-
based authentication protocol (C2MP) for RFID applica-
tions, and the main contributions are as follows.
• The semi-group property of Chebyshev chaotic map is
introduced for authentication. The defined algebraic
relationships of the Chebyshev polynomials are
adopted to realize mutual trust relationship among the
legal entities.
• The chaotic property of Chebyshev chaotic map is
applied to enhance anonymous message transmission.
An attacker cannot obtain any sensitive information of
the ongoing session due to irregular message flows.
• The pseudo-random numbers are adopted to enhance
the randomization and forward security of the interac-
tions, and session freshness is achieved to against a
typical attack such as replay attack.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces the related works in RFID security.
Section 3 reviews the proposed authentication protocol.
Sections 4 and 5 present the security formal analysis and
performance analysis. Finally, Sect. 6 draws a
conclusion.
2 Related work
Tian et al. [5] proposed an ultralightweight RFID authen-
tication protocol with permutation (RAPP), which avoids
to apply the unbalanced OR and AND operations for
authentication. In the RAPP, the tags only perform the
bitwise XOR, left rotation and permutation operations.
Meanwhile, de-synchronization attacks are addressed by
the unique message transmission mode. According to the
security analysis, the RAPP satisfies the main security
properties to defend the various attacks.
Liu et al. [6] proposed a grouping-proofs based
authentication protocol (GUPA) to address the security
issue for multiple readers and tags simultaneous identifi-
cation in distributed RFID systems. In the GUPA, dis-
tributed authentication mode with independent
subgrouping proofs is adopted to enhance hierarchical
protection, an asymmetric denial scheme is applied to grant
fault-tolerance capabilities against an illegal reader or tag,
and a sequence based odd-even alternation group subscript
is presented to define a function for secret updating. It
indicates that the GUPA realizing both secure and simul-
taneous identification is efficient for the resource con-
strained distributed RFID systems.
Liu and Ning [7] proposed a zero-knowledge authenti-
cation protocol (ZKAP) based on alternative mode for
RFID systems. In the ZKAP, dual zero-knowledge proofs
are randomly chosen to provide anonymity and mutual
authentication without revealing any sensitive identifiers.
Pseudo-random flags and access lists are employed for
quick check to ensure high efficiency and scalability. It
indicates that the ZKAP owns no obvious design defects
theoretically and is robust enough to resist the forgery,
replay, Man-in-the-Middle (MITM), and tracking attacks.
Liu et al. [8] proposed a lightweight mutual authenti-
cation protocol based on variable linear feedback shift
registers for EPC Gen2 standard systems. An application
specific integrated circuit (ASIC) implementation of the
protocol is performed with low-power consumption.
Yao et al. [9] proposed a multiple tags privacy-pre-
serving authentication protocol (MAP) for authenticating a
batch of tags with strong privacy and high efficiency. The
MAP applies batch-type authentication pattern, and lever-
ages the collaboration among multiple tags for accelerating
the authentication speed. Both security protection and
privacy preservation are achieved in terms of confiden-
tiality, cloning resistance, tracking resistance, timing-based
attack resistance, and forward secrecy.
Morshed et al. [11] proposed an efficient mutual
authentication protocol by using individual secret values
for each tag. This protocol avoids complex hash operations
in the database to reduce the computation overhead. The
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evaluation indicates that the protocol requires a low tag
storage, computation and communication cost for light-
weight RFID applications.
Toward Chebyshev chaotic map-based authentication
protocols, Ning et al. [17] proposed an aggregated-proof
based hierarchical authentication scheme (APHA) for the
unit IoT and ubiquitous IoT. In the APHA, the aggregated-
proofs are established for multiple targets to achieve
backward and forward anonymous data transmission; and
directed path descriptors, homomorphism functions, and
Chebyshev chaotic maps are jointly applied for mutual
authentication. Particularly, Chebyshev chaotic maps are
applied to describe the mapping relationships between the
shared secrets and the path descriptors for mutual
authentication.
In this work, we propose an RFID authentication pro-
tocol absorbing the merits of former schemes based on
lightweight bitwise operations. Compared with the existing
researches, the proposed C2MP based on the semi-group
property and chaotic property of Chebyshev chaotic map
differs from the conventional security scheme applying
complex hash function and cryptographic algorithms.
Considering the limitations of tags, the proposed C2MP
based on algebraic and bitwise operations is suitable for
ubiquitous systems in pervasive computing environments.
The combination of Chebyshev chaotic map, hash function,
pseudo-random numbers, and mutual authentication
mechanism has not received much attention from previous
studies.
3 The proposed authentication protocol
3.1 System initialization
In the RFID system, there are readers, tags, and a backend
database. The communication between a reader and the
database can be regarded as a secure channel, while the
communication link between a reader and a tag is suffering
from various security attacks and threats. Assume that a
reader (R) and a tag (T) own the corresponding pseudo-
nyms PIDR and PIDT, the database (DB) owns all the legal
readers and tags information and a pre-shared value
Q  T xðSÞ ðmod pÞ, in which x 2 Z is a secret value, S is
a pre-shared value, and p is a large prime. Both T and
R own the values {Q, S, p}. The detailed notations are
introduced in Table 1.
In the system initialization, hardware and software
requirements are given as follows [13].
• Tags considered in the system are smart cards com-
prising an intelligent micro-processor unit (MPU),
storage units and chip operating system (COS). Assume
that tags have the basic crypto-operational and storage
capabilities to realize data transmission in the open
channels.
• Readers are static or mobile active devices distributed
to cover the areas where tags exit. Both the readers and
the database are not power constrained, and besides the
database is regarded as the credible entity.
• The communication channel between a reader and the
back-end database is assumed to be secure, while the
wireless channel between a reader and a tag is
vulnerable.
Note that the physical destructions such as removing a
tag physically from a tagged item are not considered since
there are no technical methods to discriminate between
intentional or unintentional behaviors.
The Chebyshev chaotic maps is available for authenti-
cation [18, 19]. Suppose that a Chebyshev polynomial
T xðmÞ is in x of degree m, and T xðmÞ : ½1; 1 ! ½1; 1 is
defined as follows:
T xðmÞ ¼ cosðl  arccosðmÞÞ
The Chebyshev polynomials satisfy the following
relationships.
T 0ðmÞ ¼ 1;
T 1ðmÞ ¼ m;
T xðmÞ ¼ cosðl  arccosðmÞÞ; ðl 2Þ:
Define the degrees {x1, x2} are positive integer numbers.
The Chebyshev polynomials T x1ðmÞ and T x2ðmÞ
(m 2 ½1;1) are assigned with the semigroup and
chaotic properties.
T xðmÞ  ð2mT l1ðmÞ  T x2ðmÞÞðmod qÞ; ðl 2Þ;
T x1ðT x2ðmÞÞ
In the trust model, DB is an only entity trusted by all the
readers and tags. There is no other direct trust relationships
Table 1 Notations
Notation Description
R, T, DB The reader, tag, and database
PIDR;PIDT The reader/tag’s pseudonym
rR; rT The reader/tag’s pseudo-random numbers
TIDR; TID
0





T The tag’s temp pseudonym
S, Q The pre-shared value for the legal entities
x, y, z The random integers
T ð:Þ The Chebyshev polynomial
H(.) The hash function
k The comparison operator
! The transition operator
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between readers and tags. Thereinto, a reader is assigned
with default access authority on a set of tags.
3.2 The protocol descriptions
An interaction among {R, T, DB} is introduced to describe
the protocol process. Figure 1 shows the proposed Che-
byshev chaotic map-based authentication protocol, and the
main message exchanges among R, T, and DB are as
follows.
3.2.1 Challenge–response between a reader and a tag
The reader R generates a pseudo-random number rR and
transmits rR to T as an access challenge to launch a new
session. Upon receiving the message, T first generates a
pseudo-random number rT, and a random integer z. There-
after, T extracts the pre-shared values {Q, S} and its
pseudonym PIDT to compute the authentication operators
{AT, BT}, a temp identifier TIDT, and a hash value HT.
AT ¼ T zðSÞ ðmod pÞ;
BT ¼ T zðQÞ ðmod pÞ;
TIDT ¼ PIDT  HðBTkrTÞ;
HT ¼ HðTIDTkBTkrRÞ:
T transmits the cascade messages rTkATkTIDTkHT to
R as a response. Upon receiving the messages, R also
generates a random integer y. Afterward, R computes its
authentication operators {AR, BR}, a temp identifier TIDR,
and a hash value HR.
AR ¼ T yðSÞ ðmod pÞ;
BR ¼ T yðQÞ ðmod pÞ;
TIDR ¼ PIDR  HðBRkrRÞ;
HR ¼ HðTIDRkBRkrTÞ:
3.2.2 Authentication on both reader and tag
by the database
R transmits the cascade messages rTkATkTIDTkHT and
rRkARkTIDRkHR to the database DB for authentication.
Upon receiving the messages, DB extracts the locally
stored pseudonyms {PIDT ;PIDR} to compute the values
{B0T ;B
0





tively, for {R, T}.
B0T ¼ T xðATÞ ðmod pÞ;
B0R ¼ T xðARÞ ðmod pÞ;
TID0T ¼ PIDT  HðB0TkrTÞ;
TID0R ¼ PIDR  HðB0RkrRÞ:
According to Q  T xðSÞ ðmod pÞ, it turns out that B0T ¼
BT will hold.
B0T ¼ T xðATÞ ðmod pÞ ¼ T xðT zðSÞÞ ðmod pÞ;
BT ¼ T zðQÞ ðmod pÞ ¼ T zðT xðSÞÞ ðmod pÞ:
Similarly, B0R ¼ BR can also be obtained since
T yðT xðSÞÞ ðmod pÞ theoretically equals T xðT yðSÞÞ
ðmod pÞ.
DB checks the validity of {T, R} by computing the hash
values HðTID0TkB0TkrRÞ and HðTID0RkB0RkrTÞ, and com-
pares whether the received values {HT ;HR} equal the
computed values. If HT ¼ HðTID0TkB0TkrRÞ and HR ¼
HðTID0RkB0RkrTÞ hold, DB will regard T and R as legal
entities; otherwise, the protocol will terminate.




PID0T ¼ TID0T  HðB0RkrRÞ
3.2.3 Authentication on the reader by the tag
Upon receiving the messages, R computes the temp iden-
tifier TID00T , an authentication operator SR, and a hash value
MR. R transmits the cascade messages ARkMR to T for
further authentication.
TID00T ¼ PID0T  HðBRkrRÞ;
SR ¼ T yðATÞ ðmod pÞ;
MR ¼ HðTID00TkSRkrTÞ:
Thereafter, T computes a value ST and checks the
validity of R by re-computing the hash value
HðTIDTkSTkrTÞ. According to Q  T xðSÞ ðmod pÞ, it
turns out that ST = SR since T zðT yðSÞÞ ðmod pÞ ¼
T yðT zðSÞÞ ðmod pÞ. If MR ¼ HðTIDTkSTkrTÞ holds, T will
regard R as a legal reader; otherwise, the protocol will
terminate.
ST ¼ T zðARÞ ðmod pÞFig. 1 The Chebyshev chaotic map-based authentication protocol
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Till now, R, T and DB have established the trusting
relationships, and DB has authenticated {R, T} as legal
entities. The Chebyshev chaotic map is applied for
authentication, and the main authentication phases can be
described as follows:
• R ? T: rR;
• T ? R: rTkATkTIDTkHT ;
• R ? DB: rTkATkTIDTkHT ; rRkARkTIDRkHR;
• DB ? R: PID0T ;
• R ? T: ARkMR.
3.3 Security properties
The proposed C2MP is based on Chebyshev polynomials to
adopt authentication, anonymity, and session freshness
mechanisms to enhance security protection in the RFID
systems.
3.3.1 Authentication
The authentication mechanism is applied to establish the
mutual trusting relationships between interactive entities.
Thereinto, the database DB can be regarded as a trusted
entity in the system. Note that the semigroup property of
the Chebyshev polynomials is introduced for authentica-
tion, and the detailed authentication includes the following
aspects:
• The database DB performs authentication on both
reader R and tag T by checking whether the received
values {HT, HR} equal the computed hash values
HðTID0TkB0TkrRÞ and HðTID0RkB0RkrTÞ. According to
Q  T xðSÞ ðmod pÞ, it turns out that B0T ¼ BT and
B0R ¼ BR will hold.
• The tag T performs authentication on the reader R by
checking the consistency of the received MR and the re-
computing the hash value HðTIDTkSTkrTÞ. It turns out
that ST ¼ SR since T zðT yðSÞÞ ðmod pÞ ¼ T yðT zðSÞÞ
ðmod pÞ holds.
3.3.2 Anonymity
The pseudonyms {PIDR;PIDT} are wrapped along with the







R} are transmitted instead of the pseudo-
nyms. The anonymous transmission mode makes that any
attacker cannot obtain the real identifiers during the
authentication process. Moreover, the polynomial’s chaotic
property enhances the anonymity due to the irregular
message flow.
Meanwhile, data integrity is also achieved by one-way
hash functions to guarantee that the interactive data cannot
be modified during the authentication process.
• The tag’s temp identifiers {TIDT ; TID0T ; TID00T} and
reader’s temp identifiers {TIDR; TID
0
R} are computed
by wrapping the pseudonyms PIDT and PIDR with the
hash values HðBkrÞ and HðB0krÞ.
• The values {HT ;HR;MR} are respectively computed by
hashing the values TIDTkBTkrR and TIDRkBRkrT .
Such hash values realize that any attacker cannot derive
the sensitive information even if it obtains the exchanged
messages via the open channels. The authentication pro-
tocol considers the channel limitations and applies light-
weight hash functions in the wireless networks to realize
the trade-off of security and efficiency.
3.3.3 Session freshness
Session freshness is achieved by introducing pseudo-ran-
dom numbers, which also enhance the randomization and
forward security.
• The pseudo-random numbers rR and rT are generated
by the pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) and
are used to compute the temp identifiers and hash
values such as {TID; TID0;H;MR}.
• The random integers x, y and z are generated to
determine the degree of the Chebyshev polynomial
T ð:Þ, which is applied for further authentication.
The current security compromises cannot correlate with
the previous interactions due to the pseudo-random
numbers.
4 Security formal analysis with BAN logic
In this section, Burrows–Abadi–Needham (i.e., BAN) logic
[20] is applied to analyze the design correctness of the
C2MP. The BAN logic is a rigorous evaluation method to
detect subtle defects for authentication protocols. The
security formal analysis focuses on belief and freshness,
and involves the following steps:
1. Formalization of the protocol messages;
2. Declaration of initial assumptions;
3. Declaration of anticipant goals;
4. Verification by logical rules and formulas.
The main reasoning progress is based on the belief use
postulates and definitions to determine whether the proto-
col goals can be derived from the initial assumptions and
message exchanges. If such derivation exists, the protocol
Pers Ubiquit Comput (2015) 19:1053–1061 1057
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will be regarded as reasonable. Table 2 shows formal
notations in the BAN logic.
4.1 Message formalization
According to the authentication phases of the C2MP, the
formalized messages (M) delivered among R, T and DB can
be described in the following forms.
• M1 (R! T): T / rR.
T receives rR from R, and can repeat rR.
• M2 (T ! R): R / rT ;R /AT ;R / TIDT ;R /HT .
R receives rTkATkTIDTkHT from T and can repeat the
messages.
• M3 (R! DB): DB / rT ;DB /AT ;DB / TIDT ,
DB /HT ;DB / rR;DB /AR;DB / TIDR;DB /HR.
DB receives rTkATkTIDTkHT and rRkARkTIDRkHR
from R and can repeat the messages.
• M4 (DB! R): R /PID0T .
R receives PID0T from DB, and can repeat the messages.
• M5 (R! T): T /AR; T /MR.
T receives ARkMR from R, and can repeat the messages.
4.2 Initial assumptions
The initial possessions and abilities of each participant are
defined, and the initiative assumptions (IA) can be obtained
as follows.
• For T:
IA1.1: T j  R()S;Q;p T ,
IA1.2: T j  DB()PIDT T ,
IA1.3: T j  ]ðrT ; zÞ,
IA1.4: T j  DBj ) ðPIDT ; xÞ.
IA1.1: T believes that the secrets {S, Q, p} are shared
with R;
IA1.2: T believes that the pseudonym PIDT is shared
with DB;
IA1.3: T believes that the values {rT ; z} are fresh and
have never been sent before the current session;
IA1.4: T believes that DB has jurisdiction over the
values {PIDT ; x}.
• For R:
IA2.1: Rj  T()S;Q;p R,
IA2.2: Rj  DB()PIDR R,
IA2.3: Rj  ]ðrR; yÞ,
IA2.4: Rj  DBj ) ðPIDR; xÞ.
IA2.1: R believes that the secrets {S, Q, p} are shared
with T;
IA2.2: R believes that the pseudonym PIDR is shared
with DB;
IA2.3: R believes that the values {rR; y} are fresh, and
have never been sent before the current session;
IA2.4: R believes that DB has jurisdiction over the
values {PIDR; x}.
• For DB:
IA3.1: DBj  T()PIDT DB,
IA3.2: DBj  R()PIDR DB,
IA3.3: DBj  T j ) ðPIDT ; zÞ,
IA3.4: DBj  Rj ) ðPIDR; yÞ.
IA3.1: DB believes that the pseudonym PIDT is shared
with T;
IA3.2: DB believes that the pseudonym PIDR is shared
with R;
IA3.3: DB believes that T has jurisdiction over the
values {PIDT ; z};
IA3.4: DB believes that R has jurisdiction over the
values {PIDR; y};
4.3 Anticipant goals
The main objectives are the data belief and freshness R,
T and DB. It guarantees that the messages are from trus-
table entities and were not used in former sessions. The
anticipant goals (G) can be obtained as follows.
G1: Tj  Rj 	PIDT ,
Table 2 The formal notations [20]
Notation Description
Pj  X P believes X, or P would be entitled to believe X
P /X P sees X. A party has sent a message containing X to
P who can read and repeat X
Pj 	X P once said X. P sent a message including the
statement X before, and P believed X when he sent
the message
Pj ) X P has jurisdiction over X. P is an authority on X and
should be trusted on this matter
]ðXÞ X is fresh, and X has not been sent in a message at
any time before the current run of the protocol
P !X P0 X is a secret known only to P and P0, and trusted by
them. Only P and P0 may use X to prove their
identities to each other
fXgY X is combined with the formula Y. It means that Y is
a secret and that its presence prove the identity of
whoever utters fXgY
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G2: Tj  ]ðMRÞ,
G3: Tj  DB()PIDR R,
G4: Rj  DB()PIDT T ,
G5: Rj  ]ðHTÞ,
G6: DBj  Tj 	Q,
G7: DBj  Rj 	Q.
G1: T believes that R once sent a message including the
statement PIDT;
G2: T believes that the message MR is fresh, i.e., T be-
lieves that MR has not been sent in a message at any time
before the current run of the protocol;
G3: T believes the pseudonym PIDR is shared as a secret
by DB and R;
G4: R believes the pseudonym PIDT is shared as a secret
by DB and T;
G5: R believes that the message HR is fresh;
G6: DB believes that T once sent a message including
the statement Q;
G7: DB believes that R once sent a message including
the statement Q.
Thereinto, G1, G3, G4, G6 and G7 refer to the belief
requirements, and messages are sent from the legal par-
ticipants instead of malicious attackers. G2 and G5 indicate
freshness requirements. The received messages were not
used by malicious attackers in the previous sessions.
4.4 Logic verification
The logic verification is performed based on the message
formalization, initial assumptions, and BAN logic rules.
Theorem 1 T believes that R once sent a message
including the statement PIDT :
Proof According to M5: T /AR; T /MR, it turns out that
T has received messages AR and MR. Thereinto, AR is a
Chebyshev polynomial T yð:Þ containing S, and MR is a
hash value involving TID00T ; SR and rT .
Here, TID00T is a temp value computed by introducing
TID0T , which theoretically equals TIDT ¼ PIDT
HðBTkrTÞ. Thus, T /MR can be regarded as follows, in
which  means omitted parameters.
T / ðhPIDTiQ; Þ
Applying the seeing rule (R1):
P / ðX;YÞ
P /X , we obtain that a
party has sent a message containing hPIDTiQ to T.
T / hPIDTiQ
According to IA1.1: Tj  R !S;Q;p T ; T believes that the
secrets {S, Q, p} are shared with R. Applying the message-
meaning rule (RM3):
PjP0  !Y P;P / hXiY
PjP0 j 	X , we obtain that:
T j  Rj 	PIDT
If T believes that Q is a shared secret with R, and
T receives hPIDTiQ; T will believe that R once conveyed
the message PIDT. Till now, G1 has been proven.
Theorem 2 T believes that the message MR is fresh.
Proof According to M5: T /MR, it turns out that T has
received messages MR, which is a hash value involving
TID00T ; SR and rT . Thus, T /MR can be regarded as follows.
T / ðrT ; Þ
According to IA1.3: Tj  ]ðrTÞ; T believes that rT is




T j  ]ðrT ; Þ
If one part of MR (marked as ðrT ; Þ) is known to be
fresh, then MR are also fresh. Thus, T will believe that the
message MR is fresh, and G2 has been proven.
Theorem 3 T believes the pseudonym PIDR is shared as
a secret by DB and R.
Proof DB can be regarded as a secure entity during the
interactions, and we obtain that:
T j  DBj ) ðDBj  Þ;
T j  DBj  ðDBj  Þ:
According to IA3.2: DBj  R()PIDR DB;DB believes that
the pseudonym PIDR is shared with R. It also means that
DBj  DB()PIDR R, and we obtain that:
T j  DBj ) DB()PIDR R
 
;
T j  DBj  DB()PIDR R
 
:
T believes that DB is honest and competent, and DB
believes that the pseudonym PIDR shared by DB and R is
honest.




T j  DB()PIDR R
If T believes that DB has jurisdiction over a statement,
then T trusts DB on the truth of the statement. Thus,
T believes the pseudonym PIDR is shared as a secret by DB
and R, and G3 has been proven.
Theorem 4 R believes the pseudonym PIDT is shared as
a secret by DB and T.
Pers Ubiquit Comput (2015) 19:1053–1061 1059
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Proof According to the secure communication channel
between R and DB, we obtain that:
Rj  DBj ) ðDBj  Þ;
Rj  DBj  ðDBj  Þ:
Similarly, according to IA3.1 and J1, we obtain that:
DBj  DB()PIDT T;
Rj  DBj ) ðDB()PIDT TÞ;
Rj  DB()PIDT T :
Thus, R believes the pseudonym PIDT is shared by DB
and T, and G4 has been proven.
Theorem 5 R believes that the value HT is fresh.
Proof According to M2: R /HR, it turns out that R has
received messages HR, which is a hash value involving
TIDT ;BT , and rRÞ. Thus, R /HR can be regarded as follows.
R / ðrR; Þ
According to IA2.3: Rj  ]ðrRÞ;R believes that rR is




Rj  ]ðrR; Þ
If one part of HR (marked as ðrR; Þ) is known to be
fresh, then HR are also fresh. Thus, R will believe that the
message HR is fresh (Rj  ]ðHRÞ), and G5 has been proven.
Theorem 6 DB believes that T once sent a message
including the statement Q.
Proof According to M3: DB / TIDT ;DB receives the
message TIDT . Here, TIDT is computed involving PIDT ;BT
and rR, in which BT ¼ T zðQÞ. Thus, DB / TIDT can be
regarded as follows.
DB / ðhQiPIDT ; Þ
Applying the seeing rule (R1):
P / ðX;YÞ
P /X , we obtain that:
DB / hQiPIDT
According to IA3.1: DBj  T()PIDT DB;DB believes that
the secret PIDT is shared with t. Applying the message-
meaning rule (RM3):
PjP0  !Y P;P / hXiY
PjP0 j 	X , we obtain that:
DBj  Tj 	Q
If DB believes that PIDT is a shared secret with R, and
DB receives hQiPIDT ;DB will believe that T once conveyed
the message Q. Till now, G6 has been proven, and G7 can
also be achieved via the similar procedures.
In summary, the BAN logic based security proof is
demonstrated for formal analysis. In C2MP, R, T, and DB
can, respectively, establish beliefs via the authentication,
and the C2MP is proved to be correct and ensures
nonexistence of obvious design defects.
5 Performance analysis
In performance analysis, the C2MP is investigated from
three aspects: storage requirement, communication over-
head and computation load.
• Storage requirement In the C2MP, T/R stores the tag/
reader real identifier IDT /IDR, pseudonym PIDT/PIDR,
and the shared secrets {Q, S, p}. A 64-bit length is
assumed for ID and PID according to ISO/IEC
related standard. Additional memory consumption on
PRNG and Chebyshev polynomials is necessary during
protocol execution. In the C2MP, DB can be regarded
as a resource-rich entity, which stores all the legal tags/
readers’ real identifiers and pseudonyms. Note that an
efficient implementation of hash functions (e.g. MD5,
SHA-1, SHA-256) could be introduced with 16.0K–
23.0K gates requirement [21].
• Communication overhead Communication overhead is
the number of transmitted bit stream for each phase or
for a full run of the protocol. In the C2MP, the
number of transmitting frames depends on message
exchanges in authentication phases. The communica-
tion overhead refers to the sum of signaling loads
during each authentication session. Suppose the Che-
byshev polynomials have L-bit length, the pseudo-
nyms of readers and tags have the same length 64-bit,
the pseudo-random numbers have 16-bit length, and
the hash values have 128-bit length. The total length
of message deliveries between a reader and a tag are
(52þ 1=4L) bytes. The total authentication progress
completed via 5 phases is acceptable in practical
applications.
• Computation load During the entire round, T performs
two PRNG operations, three Chebyshev polynomials
T zð:Þ, one XOR bitwise operations, and three hash
functions. R performs two PRNG operations, three
Chebyshev polynomials T yð:Þ, two XOR bitwise oper-
ations, and four hash functions. There are no complex
encryption operations in the C2MP. Based on the
existing technology, smart cards (e.g. MIFARE Plus,
and MIFARE DESFire) [22] comprise with micro-
processor unit (MPU), storage units, and chip operating
system (COS). They can efficiently support the required
algebraic algorithms. The power-saving module should
be considered to deal with multi-rounds of Chebyshev
chaotic maps.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, a Chebyshev chaotic map-based authentica-
tion protocol is proposed to address the security issues in
RFID systems. The proposed C2MP adopts authentication,
anonymity, and session freshness mechanism to enhance
security and privacy protection. Particularly, Chebyshev
polynomial’s semigroup and chaotic properties are intro-
duced for identity authentication and anonymous trans-
mission. Dual random numbers are generated to achieve
session freshness and forward security, and one-way hash
functions are adopted for data integrity. The C2MP is
verified by BAN logic to provide that there is nonexistence
of obvious design flaws and security errors. It indicates that
the C2MP is suitable for universal RFID applications.
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